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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL * 
HEALTH - DAVIS, INC., a Utah 
Nonprofit Corporation, * 
Plaintiff/Appellant, * Case No. 20030940-CA 
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION, * 
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie, 
Commissioner Carol R. Page, * 
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun; 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK, * 
Steve S. Rawlings, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order denying the request of plaintiff Utahns for Better 
Dental Health - Davis, Inc. (UBDH) for an award of attorney fees incurred in a 
successful challenge to Davis County's placement on the 2002 general election ballot of 
an "initiative petition" requesting a re-vote on a water fluoridation question that 
previously had been submitted to and approved by the voters. This Court has jurisdiction 
over the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The principal issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying UBDH's request for an award of attorney fees under the private 
attorney general doctrine. An additional issue is whether the court correctly identified the 
criteria to be considered in applying that doctrine. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
In the Davis County general election held in November 2000, the voters approved 
the addition of fluoride to the public water supplies within the county. Thereafter, the 
operators of the public water systems, in compliance with an order issued by the Davis 
County Health Department, began to add fluoride to the water. (R. 277). On May 8, 
2001, a group of Davis County citizens filed an application, under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 20A-7-502 (2003), with the Davis County Clerk, Steve Rawlings, to circulate an 
initiative petition titled "Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act." (R. 278). The petition 
requested a "Repeal of prior action," a re-vote on the fluoridation issue, and resubmission 
of the following question to the voters: "Should fluoride be added to the public water 
supplies within Davis County." (R. 278). 
The sponsors began circulating their petition, which requested that it be submitted 
to the Davis County Commission for approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to the 
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voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election if the Commission rejected the 
petition or took no action on it. (R. 278). After Clerk Rawlings verified the requisite 
number of signatures for a local initiative petition under the applicable statute, he 
submitted it to the Commission on July 9, 2002. At the Commission's next scheduled 
meeting on August 6, 2002, it took no action on the petition, and Clerk Rawlings, on the 
advice of legal counsel, stated that he would put the petition question on the general 
election ballot as required by law. (R. 278). 
In response thereto, UBDH brought an action against the Davis County 
Commission and Clerk Rawlings for a declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief, 
which asked the trial court to enjoin Davis County from placing the fluoridation question 
on its 2002 general election ballot for a re-vote. (R. 275-76). After a hearing on the 
matter, the trial court ruled that the initiative petition was in substance a "local 
referendum," which had not been timely filed under the applicable statute. (R. 282). 
Accordingly, the court granted UBDH a permanent injunction enjoining Clerk Rawlings 
from placing the initiative petition on the ballot. (R. 284-85).l 
Thereafter, UBDH filed a motion for an award of attorney fees, arguing that it was 
entitled to recover fees under the private attorney general doctrine enunciated in Stewart 
v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994). The trial court rejected 
that argument and denied the motion. (R. 852-56). 
In making its ruling, the court determined that UBDH had standing to bring the action 
for an injunction and that the Commission was not a proper party and would be 
dismissed. (R. 278-80). 
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B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
In denying Li! JH ' s request for attorney fees, the trial court entered the following 
"Findings of Fact": 
1. The Defendant, Steve Rawlings, is the elected Davis County 
Clerk/Auditor and is the chief election officer for Davis County and 
occupied that position during the time periods relevant to the issues before 
the Court. 
2. The defendant conducted the 2000 general election and pursuant to 
resolutions enacted by the Davis County Commission did cause a 
countywide proposal concerning whether fluoride should be added to the 
drinking water of the residents of Davis County to be placed on the ballot. 
In addition to the resolution he did cause a voter information pamphlet to 
be published concerning the pros and cons of implementing fluoridation 
and did insert in the front of the pamphlet information supplied to him by 
some cities and Weber Basin Water District on estimated costs to fluoridate 
County water systems. 
3. The Court has previously entered factual findings in the prior ruling 
entered on October 15, 2002, and such are incorporated by reference into 
the findings herein. 
4. Additionally, the Court finds that the defendant Clerk/Auditor sought 
the legal advice of the Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney Gerald Hess at 
all stages of the initiative process and followed the legal advice of counsel 
and that he performed his duties and responsibilities as the Clerk/Auditor 
thought appropriate and in conformance with his good faith understanding 
of what the law was at the time. 
5. The Court finds that Defendants Clerk/Auditor and Commissioners 
followed the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based 
upon their interpretation of the Utah Constitution, the initiative statutes 
UCA 20A-7-501 et seq., and UCA 19-4-111 of the Safe Drinking Water 
Act, and documents filed by the initiative sponsors. 
6. The Court finds that there is no evidence of bad faith, bias or abdication 
of duties on the part of the Clerk/Auditor or Commissioners in the events of 
2002 and the suggestions of bias from events in 2000-2001 are simply not 
persuasive that the Clerk/Auditor abused or exceeded the scope of his 
authority as a public official. 
4 
7. The Court finds that there was no evidence that the actions of the 
County Government was [sic] an attempt to subvert the rights of those who 
voted in 2000 and that even though the voting rights are a significant issue 
in the context of this case, such significance does not rise to the level 
envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 885 P2d 759 (Utah 1994). 
8. The Court further finds that the evidence is insufficient to support an 
award of attorney's fees as to the other judgment alternatives set forth in 
the Stewart decision, supra, in that the litigation did not result in any 
common fund being created from which attorney's fees can be paid, nor 
does this case, in the absence of evidence of bad faith, constitute an 
extraordinary case, rather the Court finds that the case is unique and is a 
case of first impression, but not the extraordinary nature as envisioned in 
the Stewart decision. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order (hereafter "Order") at 2-3 (R. 853-54). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UBDH fails to show that the trial court, in denying UBDH's request for an award 
of attorney fees, failed to properly identify the criteria for application of the private 
attorney general doctrine adopted in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 
P.2d 759 (Utah 1994). First, with respect to the trial court's consideration of the absence 
of bad faith on the part of the Davis County Clerk, UBDH invited the error it now assigns 
on appeal. Second, the trial court did not err in considering the absence of a common 
fund in denying a fee award. That is a proper consideration under the Stewart formula. 
And third, the court correctly factored into its application of the private attorney general 
doctrine the Stewart court's emphasis on the monetary benefit the private litigants in that 
case created for a large class of citizens across the state - something that was not present 
in the instant case. 
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Finally, UBDH fails to show that under the highly deferential standard for 
reviewing a decision on an attorney fee award under the private attorney general doctrine, 
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that this case did not rise to the level of 
the "extraordinary" case envisioned in Stewart, where the court determined that an award 
of fees was appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying UBDH's request for attorney 
fees under the private attorney general doctrine; nor did it commit legal error in 
applying that doctrine. 
A, Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision concerning an attorney fee award under 
the private attorney general doctrine for abuse of discretion only. Shipman v. Evans, 
2004 UT 44,125, P.3d . Whether the trial court correctly identified the criteria 
for a fee award under that doctrine presents a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998) ("Generally, we 
review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial court no 
particular deference."). 
B. UBDH invited any error the trial court committed by considering the possible 
bias or bad faith of the government officials in determining whether an 
attorney fee award was justified under the private attorney general doctrine; 
further, UBDH's attack on the trial court's finding of no bias or bad faith 
should be rejected due to UBDH's failure to comply with the marshaling rule. 
In arguing that the trial court erred in denying an award of attorney fees under the 
private attorney general doctrine adopted in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 
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885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), UBDH contends that the court committed legal error by 
considering the "absence of bad faith." UBDH asserts that the trial court "graft[ed] a new 
legal standard [- i.e., a bad faith requirement - ] onto the Stewart decision, for which 
there is no basis in the Utah Supreme Court's enunciation of the Private Attorney General 
Doctrine[.]" Aplt.'s Br. at 33. For the reasons that follow, UBDH is no position to 
assign error on that point. 
In Stewart, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the private attorney general exception 
to the traditional rule that a prevailing party cannot recover attorney fees unless a statute 
or contract authorizes such an award. It adopted the principle that attorney fees may be 
awarded to a party "as a 'private attorney general' when the 'vindication of a strong or 
societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary costs in doing so 
'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring 
subsidization.'" 885 P.2d at 783 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 326, 569 
P.2d 1303, 1314(1977)). 
In the trial court, the centerpiece of UBDH's argument for an attorney fee award 
under the private attorney general doctrine was the allegation that Clerk Rawlings and the 
Commission acted in bad faith or in a biased fashion in moving the initiative petition 
forward to a spot on the ballot, because they had a personal interest in seeing the 
fluoridation question put on the ballot for a re-vote. For example, UBDH presented the 
following argument to the trial court in support of UBDH's motion for attorney fees: 
As plaintiff discovered by checking the records at the County 
Clerk's office, both the County Clerk and the Davis County Commission 
Chairman had signed onto the petition to repeal fluoridation. Neither the 
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Clerk nor the Commission ever disclosed this fact in any public forum. 
More importantly, they failed to disclose during the public meeting on 
August 6, 2002 that they themselves had signed onto the petition, and that 
they personally supported a re-vote and the repeal of fluoridation. Given 
Commission Chairman McConkie's failure to disclose that he was a 
petition signer, his statements at the meeting to the effect that "We don't 
want to give anyone cause to say we are for or against a re-vote," ring 
hypocritically hollow. 
[] Nevertheless, without disclosing their pro-"initiative" bias or the 
fact that they had personally signed onto the very petition then before them 
for their consideration, the Commission and Clerk rejected any attempt to 
determine whether the "initiative petition" was legal and valid, and by 
dramatically opting to take no action, positively ensured that it advanced to 
the general election ballot. By declining to act, they knowingly advanced 
their own personal cause, and by failing to determine that the "initiative 
petition" was, in fact, an illegal, out-of-time referendum, they ensured that 
their personal political views would advance. * * *. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs at 
6 (R. 301-02). 
UBDH repeated the bias/bad faith mantra in its motion for an evidentiary hearing. 
See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing at 4-5 ("The 
[Clerk's] personal bias against fluoridation persisted, and still persists."; "The Personal 
Bias Of The Defendant Adds An Element Of Abdication Of His Official Responsibility 
To Assure Ballot Integrity, Which Goes Beyond The Agency Abdication Of The Stewart 
Case."). And, at the evidentiary hearing that UBDH convinced the trial court to hold on 
the attorney fees question, UBDH went to great lengths to develop evidence of Clerk 
Rawlings's alleged bias (R. 874) and then specifically argued the point in asking for fees: 
From the beginning of this issue's presence in the County, Your 
Honor, there has been a series of actions taken by the County Clerk as the 
Chief Elections Officer of the County. 
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And we believe and have argued that these various actions are as a 
result of the bias against fluoridation on the part of the Clerk. 
(R. 874-Tr. 190). 
It is clear from the foregoing that UBDH invited the court to consider the alleged 
bias or bad faith of the government officials, particularly Clerk Rawlings, in deciding 
whether to award attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. UBDH 
therefore cannot now complain that the court committed legal error by factoring in the 
"absence of evidence of bad faith" in denying fees under that doctrine. By presenting 
bias or bad faith as an issue for the court's consideration, UBDH invited the error it now 
assigns on appeal. In short, it led the court into the alleged error. Under the well-
established invited error doctrine, UBDH is in no position to seek relief on appeal. As 
the Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) 
(footnote omitted), "on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at 
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Put another way, 
"[t]he doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then 
complaining of it on appeal." Miller v. Martineau & Co., Certified Pub. Accountants, 
1999 UT App 216,^42, 983 P.2d 1107.2 
Nor is UBDH in a position to argue that plain error occurred, if it were able to show 
that bias or bad faith is clearly not a proper consideration in applying the private attorney 
general doctrine. See, e.g., Punsly v. Ho, 129 Cal.Rptr. 89, 97 (2003) (bad faith or 
inappropriate conduct by a party is not a consideration falling within the statutory criteria 
for awards of private attorney general fees). As this Court has made clear, invited error 
defeats a claim of plain error. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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Furthermore, insofar as UBDH attacks the trial court's finding that there was no 
bias or bad faith on the part of the government officials (Order at 3; R. S54), it has failed 
to comply with the marshaling rule, which precludes a determination on appeal that the 
finding was clearly erroneous. See West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Company, 
818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("We have shown no reluctance to affirm 
when the appellant fails to adequately marshal the evidence."). 
The party challenging the trial court's finding of fact "must marshal all relevant 
evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the 
findings are clearly erroneous." Id. The marshaling requirement is a demanding one: 
|T]he marshaling requirement concept does not reflect a desire to merely 
have pertinent excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing 
court. The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Id. at 1315. Here, UBDH has failed to meet that requirement, selecting those parts of the 
evidence that support its view and leaving out other parts that do not. See ProMax 
Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("To succeed in 
its challenge to findings of fact, [the appellant] may not simply reargue its position based 
on selective excerpts of evidence presented to the trial court."). 
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A couple of examples adequately illustrate UBDH's serious missteps concerning 
the marshaling requirement. For instance, UBDH states as a fact that "[t]he Clerk pre-
approved the as yet unsubmitted petition by telling the petition sponsors that their petition 
would be 'accepted by my office as a qualified countywide initiative petition' if 'all 
applicable election requirements related to filing [ije. meeting the signature and filing 
time requirements] were met.'" Aplt.'s Br. at 18 (citing R. 806, Exhibit 9) (brackets in 
original). An examination of Exhibit 9 reveals that the actual wording of the Clerk's e-
mail was "if all applicable election law requirements are met related to the filing of the 
petition it may be accepted by my office as a qualified countywide initiative petition." 
(R. 806, Exhibit 9) (emphasis added). Thus, UBDH's statement of fact not only 
selectively omits evidence, it suggests a "pre-approval" by the Clerk that is not supported 
by the evidence. 
Another example of UBDH's failure to marshal all of the evidence is found in its 
discussion of Clerk Rawlings's effort to obtain legal advice from his son, Troy Rawlings, 
a prosecutor with the Davis County Attorney's Office. In an obvious effort to make Troy 
Rawlings look like a rabid supporter of the anti-fluoride movement (thus suggesting that 
he would be biased in the legal advice he would give his father and that his father likely 
would know that), UBDH writes: "Troy Rawlings, also a petition signer ('Yeah, you 
bet') (R. at 874-72)." Omitted from that introduction to Troy Rawlings is the following 
testimony he gave: 
Q. Is it fair to say that you are very much an opponent of water 
fluoridation? 
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A. No, that is not fair to say. 
Q. What is your opinion on that issue? 
A. Fluoridation, per se, I'm not an opponent of. If you've read my 
affidavit, I actually indicate that I allow my children to take fluoride 
supplement pills, fluoride swishes at school for my oldest child. 
My concerns related to fluoridation relate to the process and concerns 
about how it initially went on the ballot to begin with, and the process that 
got it to the vote in November of 2000. 
(R. 874 - Tr. 72-73). 
Accordingly, this Court should not consider UBDH's attack on the trial court's 
finding that the government officials were not guilty of acting in bad faith. The 
marshaling requirement has not been satisfied.3 
C. UBDH incorrectly argues that the trial court required the creation of a 
common fund or the conferral of a monetary benefit before attorney fees 
could be awarded under Stewart. 
UBDH further contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that the creation 
of a common fund or the conferral of a monetary benefit had to be the result 
of UBDH's litigation efforts in order for it to recover attorney fees under Stewart. As 
explained below, UBDH is wrong on that point. 
In denying attorney fees to UBDH, the court relied in part on the fact that "the 
litigation did not result in any common fund being created from which attorney's fees 
3
 Even if the Court were to consider UBDH's sufficiency of evidence challenge, a 
review of the record reveals that the evidence presented, viewed in a light most favorable 
to the trial court, is sufficient to support the finding of no bias or bad faith. See Utah 
Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (the party 
challenging the trial court's findings of fact "must show that the evidence, viewed in a 
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[could] be paid[.]" Order at 3, % 8 (Aplt.'s Br., Addendum 2). The "common fund" 
theory is but one alternative for a court's exercise of its inherent equitable power to 
award reasonable attorney fees, something the Utah Supreme Court recognized in 
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 & n.17. Contrary to UBDH's suggestion, the trial court did not 
rest its decision to deny fees solely on the absence of a common fund. Rather, the court 
simply noted that a common fund had not resulted from the litigation and then moved on 
to consider the application of the private attorney general doctrine, an alternative to the 
common fund theory for an award of attorney fees. Order at 3, Tf 8 ("nor does the case 
* * * constitute an extraordinary case * * * as envisioned in Stewart"); see Stewart, 885 
P.2d at 783 n.19 ("In holding that the private attorney general doctrine applies here, we 
note the exceptional nature of the case. We further note that any future award of attorney 
fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary case."). 
UBDH's additional contention that the trial court "incorrectly equated 'societally 
important public policy' with monetary benefit," Aplt.'s Br. at 32, is similarly without 
merit. UBDH bases that contention on the following comment made by the court at oral 
argument: 
Oh, I agree, the Supreme Court [in Stewart] recognizes that there's 
this Attorney General Exception if there's a vindication of important public 
policy, public right. 
But then in * * * the application of that rule in this specific case, it 
was the financial benefit that it seems to me was the most persuasive 
element. 
light most favorable to the trial court, is legally insufficient to support the contested 
finding."); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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(R. 874 - Tr. 207). In response to that comment, UBDH's counsel said: 
Well, clearly the financial element figures into the decision. But I 
think there's nothing in the case that says in any kind of black letter way, 
this financial element has to be present in order for an issue to be of a 
strong or societally important public policy nature. 
(Id.). The court then replied: 
But you and I know of no other cases, no other extraordinary cases, 
using the Supreme Court's language, where they have applied the Attorney 
General Exception in the vindication of public interest other than this one. 
(R. 874 - Tr. 207-08). 
A fair reading of the foregoing exchange leads to the conclusion that the court was 
not equating "a vindication of important public policy" with "financial benefit"; rather, it 
merely was observing that the financial benefit to ratepayers that resulted from the 
litigation in Stewart was an important factor in the supreme court's decision to award 
attorney fees in an "extraordinary" case under the private attorney general doctrine. 
Indeed, the Stewart court clearly emphasized the point: 
The results achieved by the ratepayers will necessarily benefit all USWC 
ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to future rates, irrespective of 
whether a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be ordered. Here, 
USWC has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was 
authorized by the Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order to 
retain revenues in excess of a reasonable rate of return. But for plaintiffs 
action, all that would have been unchallenged, and none ofUSCW's 
ratepayers would ever have had any relief. 
Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783 (emphasis added). 
In sum, the trial court did not incorrectly interpret Stewart. Given the way that 
decision is written, one could reasonably conclude that the financial benefit to the 
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ratepayers throughout the state was a major factor in the supreme court's finding that the 
case was "extraordinary." That was the point the trial court was making. 
D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying UBDH's request for 
fees. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court explained the abuse of discretion standard for 
reviewing a trial court's decision not to award attorney fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine: 
Because we review [the court's] holding under an abuse of discretion 
standard, we will not undertake our own assessment of whether plaintiffs 
vindicated a public policy, nor will we attempt to gauge anew the 
importance of any vindicated policy, nor will we tackle the question of 
whether plaintiffs' actions were comparable to those we found 
"extraordinary" in Stewart. Instead, we review the trial court's 
determination that an equitable award was not merited * * * only to see if 
the trial court abused its discretion. 
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ^ f 25, P.3d (reviewing denial of attorney fee 
request under private attorney general doctrine). "Abuse of discretion means that the trial 
court's ruling is 'beyond the limits of reasonability.'" State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 456 
(Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)). The 
question here, then, is whether the trial court's denial of fees was "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." For the following reasons, it was not. 
The trial court's written ruling makes clear that it considered the following 
factors in concluding that although the case was "unique and * * * [one] of first 
impression, [it was] not of the extraordinary nature as envisioned in the Stewart 
decision": 
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1. In the 2000 Davis County general election, the voters approved 
the addition of fluoride to the public water supplies within the county by a 
margin of 52% in favor to 48% opposed; 
2. In 2002, after a group of Davis County citizens circulated an 
initiative petition calling for a re-vote on the fluoridation question and 
obtained the requisite number of verified signatures pursuant to the state 
statute for local initiative petitions, Clerk Rawlings, who in handling the 
petition followed the advice of legal counsel and their interpretation of 
constitutional and statutory law throughout the process, submitted the 
petition to the Davis County Commission for further action; 
3. When the Commission took no action on the petition, Clerk 
Rawlings, on the advice of legal counsel, stated that he would put the 
petition on the 2002 general election ballot as required by statute; 
4. There was no evidence of bad faith, bias, or abdication of duties 
on the part of Clerk Rawlings in his handling of the petition in 2002; and 
5. There was no evidence that the actions of the Davis County 
government were an attempt to subvert the rights of those who voted on the 
fluoridation question in 2000. 
See Order at 2-3 (in part incorporating previous findings) (Aplt.'s Br., Addendum 2). 
Further, the court implicitly took into account that the relief obtained by UBDH -
viz., an injunction prohibiting the placement of the fluoridation question on the 2002 
ballot for a re-vote by Davis County voters - was based on a determination that the 
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initiative petition was simply, in substance, an untimely referendum under statutory law, 
see Ruling at 7-8 (R. 281-82; Aplt.'s Br., Addendum 1), and compared that relief to the 
relief obtained in Stewart for all of the ratepayers in the state. In Stewart, the private 
litigants obtained substantial monetary benefits as to future rates because the private 
litigants had succeeded in having the Utah Public Service Commission's rate of return set 
aside as unlawful, a pro-utilities rate-setting statute declared unconstitutional, and the 
Commission's "incentive" plan favoring utilities held invalid. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783. 
While no one would argue that UBDH did not vindicate an important societal 
policy in obtaining an injunction that served to preserve the integrity of the 
initiative/referendum process in Davis County, the relief it obtained in this case is 
certainly less substantial than that obtained in Stewart. Nothing that UBDH 
accomplished here would prevent the anti-fluoride group from in the future complying 
with the statutory requirements for a referendum, making a timely filing of the 
referendum, and thus putting the fluoridation issue back before the voters of Davis 
County. 
In contradistinction, the elimination of the rank exploitation of ratepayers that was 
achieved by the private litigants in Stewart provided extensive and permanent relief to a 
large class of citizens throughout the state. The trial court could reasonably have 
considered that difference between the two cases and concluded that the factors making 
for an "extraordinary" case in Stewart were not present here. An analysis along those 
lines, coupled with the court's finding that there was no bias or bad faith on the part of 
the government officials in the handling of the initiative petition (an issue UBDH invited 
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the court to consider), most certainly would support the conclusion that this was not the 
extraordinary case envisioned in Stewart. Indeed, given the backdrop against which the 
trial court decided the fee issue, that conclusion is entirely consistent with the supreme 
court's statement in Shipman that "[a]wards of attorney fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine are dispensed sparingly." 2004 UT 44, % 24. At bottom, the trial court's 
denial of UBDH's fee request falls squarely within the limits of reasonability; there was 
no abuse of discretion.4 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial 
of UBDH's request for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because this case presents a somewhat different scenario than previous appellate 
cases involving the issue of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, the 
Court should hear oral argument. 
4
 In arguing that the trial court's denial of attorney fees should be reversed, UBDH 
makes much of the court's statement that this case was "unique" but not "extraordinary." 
Aplt.'s Br. At 35-37. Even if it could be said that the court's choice of the word "unique" 
to describe this case as falling short of the "extraordinary" case presented in Stewart was 
not the wisest, that is not a reason for disturbing the ruling on attorney fees. The issue 
simply is whether the court abused its discretion in drawing a distinction between Stewart 
and the instant case. As demonstrated above, it did not. 
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Dated this JQ day of October 2004. 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
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Davis County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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